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How to Model Mechanistic Hierarchies
Abstract
Mechanisms are usually viewed as hierarchical, with lower levels of a mech-
anism influencing, and decomposing, its higher-level behaviour. In order to
adequately draw quantitative predictions from a model of a mechanism, the
model needs to capture this hierarchical aspect. The recursive Bayesian net-
work (RBN) formalism was put forward as a means to model mechanistic
hierarchies (Casini et al., 2011) by decomposing variables into their consti-
tuting causal networks. The proposal was criticized by Gebharter (2014).
He proposes an alternative formalism, which decomposes arrows. Here, I
defend RBNs from the criticism and argue that they offer a better represen-
tation of mechanistic hierarchies than the rival account.
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1 Introduction
Mechanisms are usually viewed as hierarchical, with lower levels of a mecha-
nism influencing, and decomposing, its higher-level behaviour. In order to ade-
quately draw quantitative predictions from a model of a mechanism, the model
needs to capture this hierarchical aspect. The recursive Bayesian network (RBN)
formalism was put forward as a means to model mechanistic hierarchies (Casini
et al., 2011). The formalism extends the Bayesian network (BN) formalism, al-
ready used to model same-level causal relations probabilistically (Pearl, 2000). In
RBNs, higher-level variables decompose into lower-level causal BNs. The rela-
tions between a higher-level variable and its lower-level networks are constitutive.
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This proposal was criticized by Gebharter (2014) and Gebharter and Kaiser
(2014), on two main grounds: descriptive adequacy—it is unclear when the for-
malism is applicable to real mechanisms—and conceptual adequacy—RBNs do
not allow one to draw interlevel inferences for explanation and intervention. To
overcome such limitations, Gebharter (2014) has made the alternative proposal
that decomposition involves arrows rather than variables. In particular, Gebhar-
ter (2014) proposes an alternative formalism, also extending the BN formalism,
namely multilevel causal models (MLCMs).
Decomposing variables and decomposing arrows are two alternative ways of
modelling mechanistic hierarchies, by which one may extend a probabilistic in-
terpretation of causality. In this paper, I argue that the former option is superior to
the latter. I proceed as follows. In §2, I present and illustrate RBNs and MLCMs.
In §3, I argue against decomposing arrows. MLCMs lead to counterintuitive no-
tions of mechanistic decomposition and mechanistic explanation. In §4, I defend
RBNs from the criticism. RBNs do allow interlevel causal explanation, via the un-
coupling of interlevel causal relations into a constitutional step and a causal step.
RBNs also allow reasoning about interlevel interventions; believing otherwise de-
pends on either wrongly assuming that changes cannot transmit along the con-
stitutional downward-directed arrows, or on demanding that the RBN formalism
represent intervention variables, which the formalism is not meant to represent.
2 The two formalisms
Both RBNs and MLCMs are extensions of the BN formalism. A BN consists
of a finite set V = {V1, . . . ,Vn} of variables, each of which takes finitely many
possible values, together with a directed acyclic graph (DAG) whose nodes are
the variables in V , and the probability distribution P(Vi|Pari) of each variable Vi
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conditional on its parents Pari in the DAG. DAG and probability function are
linked by the Markov Condition (MC):
MC. For any Vi ∈ V = {V1, . . . ,Vn}, Vi ⊥ NDi | Pari.
In words, each variable is probabilistically independent of its non-descendants,
conditional on its parents. For instance, the DAG in figure 1 implies that V4 is
independent of V1 and V5 conditional on V2 and V3. In BN jargon, V2 and V3
‘screen off’ V4 from V1 and V5. A BN determines a joint probability distribution
over its nodes via P(v1 · · · vn) = ∏ni=1 P(vi|pari) where vi is an assignment Vi = x
of a value to Vi and pari is the assignment of values to its parents induced by the
assignment v = v1 · · · vn.
In a causally-interpreted BN, the arrows in the DAG stand for direct causal
relations and the network can be used to infer the effects of interventions and
make probabilistic predictions (Pearl, 2000). In this case, MC is called the Causal
Markov Condition (CMC).
2.1 Recursive Bayesian networks
RBNs represent hierarchies by decomposing variables (Casini et al., 2011). One
of the motivations behind this choice is that scientists often talk of properties at
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different levels that stand in a constitutive relation with one another.1 Another
motivation—only implicit in (Casini et al., 2011)—is that decomposing variables
has the additional advantage of making ‘interlevel causation’ intelligible, by un-
coupling (problematic) cases of interlevel downward or upward causation into two
(less-problematic) steps, a constitutional, across-level step and a causal, same-
level step (Craver and Bechtel, 2007). RBNs make this idea formally precise.
Mechanistic hierarchy is interpreted via the notion of ‘recursive decomposi-
tion’ of variables. An RBN is a BN defined over a finite set V of variables whose
values may themselves be RBNs. A variable is called a network variable if one or
more of its possible values is an RBN and a simple variable otherwise. A standard
BN is an RBN whose variables are all simple. An RBN x that occurs as the value
of a network variable in RBN y is said to be at a lower level than y; variables in y
are the direct superiors of variables in x while variables in the same network are
peers. If an RBN contains no infinite descending chains—i.e., if each descending
chain of networks terminates in a standard BN—then it is well-founded. Only
well-founded RBNs are considered here.
Consider a toy RBN2 defined over V = {C, S }, where C represents whether
some tissue in an organism is cancerous, taking the possible values 1 and 0, while
1 Craver (2007) proposed that constitutive relations are established by the ‘mutual manipulabil-
ity’ of higher- and lower-level properties that stand in the relation. Casini et al. (2011) referred to
Craver’s intuition to further motivate RBNs. The compatibility between Craver (2007)’s account
of constitution and interventionism (Woodward, 2003), on which Craver’s account rests, was ques-
tioned (see Baumgartner and Gebharter, 2015, and references therein). I will not discuss the issue
here. I should only emphasize that the issue is orthogonal to the adequacy of RBNs as mechanistic
models. RBNs are not tools for establishing constitution based on interventions, but tools for rep-
resenting constitutional knowledge—however this may be got—and reasoning probabilistically
across the levels.
2For more realistic examples, see Casini et al. (2011) and Clarke et al. (2014).
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S is survival after 5 years, taking the possible values yes and no. The correspond-
ing BN is: Suppose S is a simple variable but C is a network variable, with each
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of its two values denoting a lower-level (standard) BN that represents a state of
the mechanism for cancer. I will ignore many of the factors, such as DNA damage
response mechanisms, also responsible for cancer, and only focus on the unreg-
ulated cell growth and division, D, that results from mutations in the so-called
‘growth factor’, G. To the assignment of value 1 to C corresponds a lower-level
network c1 representing a functioning control mechanism, with a probabilistic de-
pendence (and a causal connection) between G and D.
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To the assignment of value 0 to C corresponds a lower-level network c0 repre-
senting a malfunctioning growth mechanism, with no dependence (and no causal
connection) between G and D.
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Since these two lower-level networks are standard BNs, the RBN is well-
founded and fully described by the three networks.
If an RBN is to be used to model a mechanism, the arrows at the various levels
of the RBN signify causal connections. In addition, just as standard causally-
interpreted BNs are subject to the CMC, a similar condition applies to causally-
interpreted RBNs, called the Recursive Causal Markov Condition (RCMC). Let
us indicate with NIDi the set of non-inferiors-or-descendants of Vi and with DSupi
the set of direct superiors of Vi. Then, RCMC says that
RCMC. For any Vi ∈ V = {V1, . . . ,Vn}, Vi ⊥ NIDi | DSupi ∪ Pari.
In words, each variable in the RBN is independent of those variables that are
neither its effects (i.e., descendants) nor its inferiors, conditional on its direct
causes (i.e., parents) and its direct superiors. RCMC adds to CMC a recursive
MC (RMC), viz. the condition that variables at any level are probabilistically in-
dependent of non-inferiors or peers given their direct superiors. Intuitively, if one
knows the value of C, knowing the value of constituent variables G or D doesn’t
add anything to one’s ability to infer to, say, the causes of C (here, none) or the
effects of C (here, S ). Notice that since the screening off that holds in virtue
of RMC depends on constitutional rather than causal facts, not all dependencies
identified by the RCMC can be causally interpreted.
6
While some authors treat CMC as a necessary truth, others argue against its
universal validity (e.g., Williamson, 2005). A similar stance is adopted with re-
spect to RCMC. RCMC is a modelling assumption in need of testing or justifi-
cation, not a necessary truth. Thus, whether or not the formalism allows one to
adequately represent a mechanism is an empirical rather than stipulative matter.
Inference in RBNs proceeds via a formal device called a flattening. Let V =
{V1, . . . ,Vm} (m≥n) be the set of variables of an RBN closed under the inferiority
relation: that is, V contains the variables in V , their direct inferiors, their direct
inferiors, and so on. Let N = {V j1 , . . . ,V jk} ⊆ V be the network variables in V.
For each assignment n = v j1 , . . . , v jk of values to the network variables we can
construct a standard BN, the flattening of the RBN with respect to n, denoted by
n↓, by taking as nodes the simple variables in V plus the assignments v j1 , . . . , v jk
to the network variables, and including an arrow from one variable to another if
the former is a parent or direct superior of the latter in the original RBN. The con-
ditional probability distributions are constrained by those in the original RBN—in
the RBN where V ji is the direct superior of Vi, P(Vi|Pari ∪ DSupi) = Pv ji (Vi|Pari).
Notice that MC holds in the flattening because the RCMC holds in the RBN.
Only, since the arrows in the flattening that link variables to their direct inferiors
are constitutional, CMC is not satisfied.3
The flattenings determine a joint distribution overV via P(v1 · · · vm) =∏m
i=1 P(vi|paridsupi), where the probabilities on the right-hand side are determined
by a flattening induced by v1 · · · vm.4
3 Notice that the role of RCMC—and of RBNs more generally (cf. fn. 1)—is not to establish
constitution. Whether an arrow in the flattening is causal or constitutional is not dictated by MC,
but depends on background knowledge.
4Pv jl (Vi | Pari) may be obtained from observed frequencies in a dataset. P(Vi | PariDSupi)
can be obtained by either determining the corresponding observed frequencies from the original
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In the cancer example, the flattening with respect to assignment c1 is c
↓
1:
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with probability distributions P(c1) = 1 and P(S |c1) determined by the top level
of the RBN, and with P(d1|g1c1) = Pc1(d1|g1) determined by the lower level (sim-
ilarly for g0 and d0). The flattening with respect to assignment c0 is c
↓
0:
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Again, P(d1|c0) = Pc0(d1) etc. In each case the required conditional distributions
are determined by the distributions given in the original RBN.
Having determined a joint distribution, the causally-interpreted RBN may be
used to draw quantitative inferences for explanation and intervention, both within
and across levels.
dataset, or by first selecting from all functions that satisfy the probabilistic constraints imposed
by the RBN the function Q with maximum entropy (cf. Williamson, 2010) and then setting P(Vi |
PariDSupi) = Q(Vi | PariDSupi).
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2.2 Multilevel causal models
According to Gebharter (2014), RBNs fail to model interlevel causal explana-
tions and interventions, due to the lack of an explicit representation of interlevel
causal arrows, over which causal influence propagates. (These objections, as I ar-
gue in §4, are based on misinterpreting RBNs.) Gebharter’s proposed formalism
purports to remedy these deficiencies by decomposing causal arrows rather than
variables.5 More precisely, a mechanistic hierarchy has to do with ‘marginalizing
out’ variables when moving from a lower-level graph to a higher-level graph. In
short, the formalism exploits the following idea: when the value of some variable
X in the set of Y’s parents Par(Y) is unknown, P(Y |Par(Y)) may be calculated by
summing over X’s possible values,
∑n
i=1 P(Y |Par(Y)X=xi), thereby marginalizing X
out. As a result, one gets a simpler probability distribution overV\{X}, consistent
with the original one overV.
Let us indicate a causal model as 〈V, E, P〉, where 〈V, E〉 is a DAG, defined over
a variable set V and a set of edges E among them, and P an associated probability
distribution.6 Let X ↔ Y indicate that two variables X and Y are effects of a latent
common cause—i.e., a cause of X and Y not represented within the graph of some
variable set V—and with P∗ ↑ V the ‘restriction’ of the probability distribution P∗
to a variable set V . The restriction of a lower-level causal model 〈V∗, E∗, P∗〉 to a
higher-level causal model 〈V, E, P〉 is so defined (2014, 147):
Restriction. 〈V, E, P〉 is a restriction of 〈V∗, E∗, P∗〉 if and only if
5Gebharter and Kaiser (2014, §3.6) make the orthogonal suggestion that levels be ontologically
distinct (partly) on the basis of constitutional relations between whole’s and parts’ properties. It is
not clear how, if at all, this proposal relates to MLCMs. Thus, I will not discuss it here.
6To be consistent with Gebharter’s notation, I henceforth denote sets with italic rather than
calligraphic fonts.
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a V ⊂ V∗, and
b P∗ ↑ V = P, and
c for all X,Y ∈ V:
c.1 if there is a directed path from X to Y in 〈V∗, E∗〉 and no vertex on
this path different from X and Y is in V , then X → Y is in 〈V, E〉,
and
c.2 if X and Y are connected by a common cause path pi in 〈V∗, E∗〉
or by a path pi free of colliders containing a bidirected edge in
〈V∗, E∗〉, and no vertex on this path pi different from X and Y is in
V , then X ↔ Y is in 〈V, E〉, and
d no path not implied by c is in 〈V, E〉.
That is, the lower-level structure 〈V∗, E∗, P∗〉 represents the higher-level structure
〈V, E, P〉 iff 〈V, E, P〉 is the restriction of 〈V∗, E∗, P∗〉 uniquely determined when
V∗ is restricted to V . The restriction is such that information about causal relations
and existence of common causes in 〈V∗, E∗〉 is preserved by 〈V, E〉, and the proba-
bilistic information of P∗ is consistent with P upon marginalizing out variables in
{V∗ \ V}.
A ‘multi-level causal model’ (MLCM) is so defined (2014, 148):
MLCM. 〈M1 = 〈V1, E1, P1〉, . . . ,Mn = 〈Vn, En, Pn〉〉 is a multi-level causal model
if and only if
a M1, . . . ,Mn are causal models, and
b every Mi with 1 < i ≤ n is a restriction of M1, and
c M1 satisfies CMC.
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Figure 7
That is, a MLCM is an ordered set of causal models 〈M1 = 〈V1, E1, P1〉, . . . ,Mn =
〈Vn, En, Pn〉〉, where the bottom-level, unrestricted causal model M1 satisfies CMC.
(Higher-level models may not satisfy CMC.) Each causal model in the MLCM
represents a mechanism.
The information on the hierarchical relations among the nested mechanisms
in the MLCM is contained in a ‘level graph’ (2014, 149):
Level graph. A graph G = 〈V, E〉 is called an MLCM 〈M1 = 〈V1, E1, P1〉, . . . ,
Mn = 〈Vn, En, Pn〉〉’s level graph if and only if
a V = {M1, . . . ,Mn}, and
b for all Mi = 〈Vi, Ei, Pi〉 and M j = 〈V j, E j, P j〉 in V: Mi → M j is in G
if and only if Vi ⊂ V j and there is no Mk = 〈Vk, Ek, Pk〉 in V such that
Vi ⊂ Vk ⊂ V j holds.
A level graph G = 〈V, E〉 is constructed from a MLCM by adding dashed (non-
causal) arrows between any two models Mi and M j, Mi → M j, if and only if Vi
is the largest proper subset of V j in MLCM, so that Mi is, so to say, the smallest
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restriction of M j. In figure 7 is an example of level graph (Gebharter, 2014, 150).
Since the ordering among graphs is not strict, there may be graph pairs (e.g., M2
and M3; M4 and M3) that do not stand in a restriction relation.
Figure 8 depicts a more concrete example (Gebharter, 2014, 151), viz. a two-
level water dispenser mechanism.7 The room temperature T causally influences a
sensor S ; S , together with the status of a tempering button, B, cause the heater H
to be on or off; H causes the temperature of the water dispensed, W.
3 Criticism of MLCMs
It is unclear whether hierarchies, as analysed in terms of the notion of ‘marginal-
izing out’, are mechanistic—that is, represent mechanistic decompositions and
grant mechanistic explanations.
7Gebharter contrasts the virtues of this MLCM with an RBN of the ‘same’ mechanism (2014,
142-3). This may be misleading, since the two models cannot possibly represent the same mech-
anism. (In a nutshell, this is because the RBN contains constitutional arrows.) This motivates my
choice of defending RBNs by reference to the toy model already introduced in §2.1.
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First, it is unclear whether MLCMs represent mechanistic decompositions.
High-level causal models in a MLCM, for instance M2 and M3 in figure 7, are
just more coarse-grain representations of one and the same structure, viz. M1,
such that some of the information in M1 is missing at the higher level, as the term
‘restriction’ suggests.
Second, it is unclear whether MLCMs represent mechanistic explanations.
Admittedly, there is a sense in which one explains the relation between, say, the
room temperature T and the water temperature W by uncovering the mediating
role of the sensor S and the heater H. However, this sort of explanation is dif-
ferent from the explanation whereby one decomposes the cancer mechanism C in
figure 2, and uncovers the role of damage G and response D. G and D have an
obvious mechanistic role—insofar as they constitute C; instead, S and H seem to
have a purely causal role.
The inadequacy of the MLCM notions of mechanistic decomposition and ex-
planation is made more explicit by looking at the kind of hierarchical relations
allowed by the formalism.
Consider the ‘decompositions’ in figure 7, which correspond to restricting (i)
V1 to V2, (ii) V1 to V3, and (iii) V3 to V5. In all such cases, instead of open-
ing a black box (as is common in mechanistic explanation), one ‘creates’ a box,
and does not, strictly speaking, decompose anything. In (i), the decomposition
is ‘filling a blank’: the absence of probabilistic and causal dependencies among
variables is explained by direct causation, a hidden common cause structure, or
combinations thereof that involve new variables, too. The absence of probabilis-
tic and causal dependencies between X and Z in M2 is explained by the structure
X ↔ Y ← Z in M1 (more on this case of ‘explanation’ below). Since there is no
arrow between X and Z in M2, and since mechanisms require causal dependen-
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cies, what mechanism is X ↔ Y ← Z in M1 a decomposition of? In (ii) and (iii),
the decomposition is in fact ‘adding stuff’. For instance, Z ↔ W in M5 is ‘decom-
posed’ into Y ← Z ↔ W in M3. But in what sense is a lower-level mechanism
that includes an isolated effect not included in the higher level a decomposition of
the higher level mechanism?
Relatedly, to some of the represented restrictions do not seem to correspond
‘explanations’ either. Consider the restriction of M4 to M5. Here, the common
cause structure Z ↔ W is ‘explained’ by the absence of probabilistic or causal
dependence between Z and a new variable X, which is apparently disconnected
from whatever mechanism is responsible for Z ↔ W. An even more striking case
of lack of explanation is the ‘decomposition’ of X and Z in M2 into X ↔ Y ← Z
in M1. A first issue—arguably non-intentional (cf. Gebharter, 2014, 146, fn. 8)—
is that the bidirected arrow in M1 violates condition c of a MLCM, namely that
M1 satisfies CMC. Still, even if condition c were satisfied, the problem would
remain that, if decompositions are to explain, this sort of decomposition should
not be allowed at any level. Intuitively, hidden common cause structures such as
X ↔ Y are, insofar as they are hidden, non-explanatory. They add a mystery rather
than remove it. A—drastic—solution that comes to mind is to forbid bidirected
arrows at any level. This would entail, however, that restrictions that marginalize
out common causes are disallowed, too, which is undesirable because—if one
buys into the MLCM framework—the corresponding decompositions would seem
(more) explanatory. One may of course impose further conditions to distinguish
good from bad restrictions, but it is not obvious how one should proceed in a non
ad hoc way, without clear intuitions on the explanatoriness of bidirected arrows.
In sum, the resulting account of mechanistic hierarchies is at best incomplete,
and at worst inadequate. To prove RBNs’ superiority, it remains to be shown
14
whether RBNs survive Gebharter (2014)’s and Gebharter and Kaiser (2014)’s ob-
jections. The next section endeavours to establish that they do.
4 Defense of RBNs
RBNs interpret mechanistic hierarchy via the operation of ‘recursive decompo-
sition’, which in turn depends on RCMC. Two kinds of objections were raised
against RCMC. First, about empirical adequacy: it is unclear when RCMC holds,
so it is unclear if the formalism is applicable to real mechanisms. Second, about
conceptual adequacy: RCMC prevents RBNs from being useful for interlevel rea-
soning for explanation and intervention. Let us begin with the first objection:
it is neither obvious that RCMC holds in general, nor is it clear how
one could distinguish cases in which it holds from cases in which it
does not. (Gebharter and Kaiser, 2014, §3.5.3)
Agreed, RCMC may not hold in general. Nor did Casini et al. (2011) claim that
it does. When does it hold, then? What RCMC adds to CMC—which is not
called into question here—is RMC. RMC has to do with the (in)dependencies
among variables at different levels. In the cancer example, RMC depends on the
constitutional relations between C on the one hand, and G and R on the other,
being such that C screens off G and D from S .
Gebharter and Kaiser (2014, §3.5.3) argue that the RBN approach would be
unable to adequately model mechanistic decompositions, where there seems to
exist no intermediate macro-level variable that corresponds to a micro-level struc-
ture. I do not dispute that there may be cases where it is hard or implausible to
define network variables that decompose into lower-level causal structures. How-
ever, this is an empirical problem, and not necessarily a problem with the formal-
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ism. It suffices to say that in many mechanisms, talk of network variables seems
uncontroversial: the state of a tissue depends on the causal structure in the cells; it
has a causal role with respect to survival; etc. Intuitively, network variables exist
whenever there are functional states that are decomposable into structures such
that RCMC holds.
In sum, I concede that RBNs are not universally applicable. Still, the con-
ditions for their applicability are clearly spelled out. When such conditions are
satisfied, RBNs provide adequate mechanistic decompositions. Notice that an
analogous reply is not open to Gebharter. Whether MLCMs adequately repre-
sents hierarchies is not an empirical matter alone; it is also a conceptual matter,
insofar as the restriction condition does not suffice to distinguish between legit-
imate and illegitimate marginalizations, that is, marginalizations that correspond
to mechanistical decompositions as opposed to marginalizations that don’t.8
Finally, let us come to the objection that RBNs do not support interlevel rea-
soning for explanation and for prediction of the results of interventions:
[Casini et al.’s] approach does (i) not allow for a graphical represen-
tation of how a mechanism’s macro variables are causally connected
to the mechanism’s causal micro structure, which is essential when it
comes to causal explanation, and it (ii) leads to the fatal consequence
that a mechanism’s macro variables’ values cannot be changed by
any intervention on the mechanism’s micro structure whatsoever (. . . )
(Gebharter, 2014, 139)
Explanation first. Since there are no arrows between variable at different lev-
els screened off by network variables, Gebharter claims that it is unclear over
8An analogous point applies to the explanatory power of RBNs (see below) vis-a`-vis MLCMs
(cf. §3).
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which causal paths probabilistic influence propagates between such higher- and
lower-level variables (2014, 143-4). True, there are no such arrows. But this is
because, by assumption, screened off variables influence each other, if at all, only
via the network variables. When RCMC is satisfied, the probabilistic influence
propagates constitutionally (rather than causally) across the dashed arrows in the
flattenings, and causally across the same-level solid arrows.
Let us now consider the second objection. With reference to the example in
figures 5 and 6, I claimed that one may, for instance, reason about the result of
a lower-level intervention on D on the probability of the higher-level variable S .
Given the observed value of P(s1), calculated as
P(s1) = P(c0)P(s1|c0) + P(c1)P(s1|c1),
one may ask: What is the effect of setting D = d1 on the probability of observing
S = s1? To answer, one calculates as follows. First, one removes the arrow
G → D from c1, so that both flattenings have the same structure below.
ci -
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Then, one calculates P(s1||d1) = P(s1d1)/P(d1), where:
P(s1d1) = P(c0s1d1) + P(c1s1d1) = P(c0)P(s1|c0)Pc0(d1) + P(c1)P(s1|c1)Pc1(d1)
P(d1) = P(c0)Pc0(d1) + P(c1)Pc1(d1)
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Gebharter objects that ‘according to the RBN approach, intervening on a mech-
anism’s microvariables does not have any probabilistic influence on any one of the
macrovariables whatsoever’ (2014, 145) because if one were to use an interven-
tion variable I to intervene on a lower-level variable, the intervention ‘would—
and this can directly be read off the BN’s associated graph’s topology (. . . )—not
have any probabilistic influence on any macrovariable at all’ (ibid.). In the cancer
example: an intervention IR on R would not have any effect on S . I think this
objection is due to either of the following misinterpretations.
First, it is true that ci screens off D from S , and thus there is no D→ S causal
arrow. However, concluding that interventions on D can make no difference to S
would be wrong. The lack of causal connections in the flattening does not block
changes along constitutional arrows. It is important to stress that, although the
dashed arrows point downwards in the flattening, this is due to technical reasons
only, having to do with the condition for MC to hold across levels. One may use
the downward-pointing arrows to reason—constitutionally—in both directions.
Here, changing D makes a constitutional difference to C, which makes a causal
difference to S . The overall difference is calculated with the RBN.
Second, it is true that RCMC says that S is independent of any variable that is
not an effect or an inferior (here, none), conditional on its direct causes (here,
C) and direct superiors (here, none). But RCMC is assumed to hold true in
V = {M, S ,G,D}, and not in the expanded setV+ = {M, S ,G,D, ID}. The reason
for this is not ad hoc. RBNs are meant to represent decompositions of (properties
of) wholes into (properties of) their parts. They are not meant to represent parts
that do not belong to any whole—which is what ID is. The graph topology can-
not represent such parts. Thus, one cannot read off the graph topology that such
interventions variables have no effect.
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More generally, in an RBN, everything one gets at lower levels must be the
result of (recursively) decomposing the top level. This is not to be seen as a limita-
tion of RBNs, but a means to an end. In the RBN formalism, one cannot represent
interventions as variables.9 Yet, one can straightforwardly represent interven-
tions as changes in values of either top-level variables or lower-level variables
into which network variables (recursively) decompose. The two representations
correspond to two well-known strategies for representing interventions, which are
exemplified by respectively Woodward (2003)’interventionist semantics and Pearl
(2000)’s do-calculus. Although both strategies are in principle legitimate, only
the latter is suitable to the task for which RBNs were developed, viz. to represent
mechanistic decompositions.
5 Conclusion
Decomposing variables and decomposing arrows are alternative ways of mod-
elling mechanistic hierarchies by means of BNs. The two options have been made
precise by, respectively, RBNs and MLCMs. I argued that RBNs are better than
MLCMs at analysing mechanistic hierarchies and interpreting interlevel mecha-
nistic reasoning. From a conceptual point of view, the argument establishes that
the notion of mechanistic hierarchy has a tight connection to the notion of recur-
sive decomposition, but no such connection to the notion of marginalizing out.
9Unless, of course, the variables describe properties of either top-level mechanisms or lower-
level sub-mechanisms obtained by way of (recursive) decompositions—in which case, however,
the intervention is not external to the mechanism, contrary to the original intention.
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